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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: A NEED
FOR CLARIFICATION OF OKLAHOMA'S
APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental reasons for incorporating a business is
to achieve limited liability.I Limited liability offers a great advantage, for
it offers the corporate investor or owner a "cap" on his liability, typically
in the amount of his investment.2 Without such limited liability, firms
could not attract the amounts of capital needed to operate efficiently, or
at all.3 Limited liability is especially important today because our society
is extremely litigious, and an investor's personal assets would otherwise
be subject to seizure if not for the corporation being an artificial entity
which is distinct and separate from the investor.
However, with the privilege of limited liability comes the responsi-
bility of operating the corporation so as to not wrongfully injure third
parties with whom it deals. When recognizing corporations as distinct
entities from their owners would be inconsistent with public policy,
courts will consider disregarding the corporate entity.4 This is known as
"piercing the corporate veil." 5 Courts consistently agree that, in some
1. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusI-
NESS ENTERPRISES § 146 (3d ed. 1983). "Incorporation for the purpose of achieving limited liability
is usually recognized on the theory that limited liability is one of the principal objectives of incorpo-
ration." Id. "Whether there are many, few, or but one shareholder, the principle that a corporation
is a legal unit separate from its shareholders... is one of convenience which dictates that corporate
rights and liabilities are not to be confused with those of even its sole shareholder." NORMAN D.
LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 11, at 65 (2d ed. 1971); see also FREDERICK J. POWELL,
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1 (1931) (stating the fundamental concept that the
corporation is a separate legal entity from its shareholders); 1 CHARLES R. P. KEATING & GAIL
O'GRADNEY, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43, at 733 (rev.
perm. ed. 1990) (stating that corporate insulation is not against public policy).
2. Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259, 263-64 (Mass. 1937).
3. Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
4. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note I, § 146, at 346.
5. Piercing the corporate veil is defined as a
[]udicial process whereby [the] court will disregard usual immunity of corporate officers or
entities from liability for wrongful corporate activities; e.g. when incorporation exists for
the sole purpose of perpetrating fraud. The doctrine which holds that the corporate struc-
ture with its attendant limited liability of stockholders may be disregarded and personal
liability imposed on stockholders, officers and directors in the case of fraud or other wrong-
ful acts done in the name of [the] corporation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147-48 (6th ed. 1990).
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situations, the corporate entity may be removed as a technical barrier
between its owner(s) and the parties with whom it deals. 6 Although ju-
risdictions have differing standards, it is generally agreed that upon a
showing of some improper purpose, the veil may be pierced.7 If the cor-
porate veil is pierced, the plaintiff will be able to obtain a judgment
against both the corporation and its owner(s), and the judgment will be
enforceable against each separately.'
Despite litigation in the area of veil-piercing, Oklahoma has
achieved little uniformity in the application of the doctrine. Perhaps the
lack of uniformity is the result of a fact-intensive analysis. However, the
standards and their application should be more clearly defined in order
to lend stability to the future of the doctrine.
II. GENERAL APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. General Policy and the Typical Corporation in a Veil-Piercing Case
Courts pierce the corporate veil in order to protect third party plain-
tiffs9 from unjust injury by the corporation, and most jurisdictions recog-
nize the doctrine as an equitable concept.10 In order to pierce the
corporate veil, it is necessary to show that some injustice will occur if the
veil is not pierced. 1  This is usually the case when a shareholder of a
corporation is aware of a plaintiff's valid claim against the corporation's
property, and the corporation intentionally acts in disregard of that
claim. 2 To put it another way, the corporate veil is pierced when the
corporation has, in some way, abused its privilege of doing business in
the corporate form. 13
The general principles for disregarding the corporate entity are ap-
plicable to all types of corporations.' 4 The situations which arise most
6. KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 41, at 602-03.
7. Id. § 41, at 603.
8. Id. § 43, at 732.
9. The aim of the doctrine is to protect third party plaintiffs who have dealt with the corpora-
tion and have been wrongfully injured in some way by it. The doctrine is generally not intended to
be used by the shareholders themselves. DeBoer Constr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 486,
496 (10th Cir. 1976); see Mainford v. Sharp, 569 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
10. KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 41.25, at 652. Therefore, if there is an adequate
remedy at law (i.e. money damages), the court will not pierce the veil even where all the necessary
elements have been shown. Id. at 653. Furthermore, the corporate entity cannot be disregarded for
one purpose and claimed for another inconsistent one. Id. § 41.20, at 639.
11. Id. § 41.25, at 652.
12. Id.
13. POWELL, supra note 1, § 2, at 2.
14. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 146, at 347.
[Vol. 28:869
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frequently involve two general categories: (1) close corporations, includ-
ing solely-owned and family-owned, and (2) parent-subsidiary arrange-
ments.'" There is generally no personal liability on the part of a
shareholder, whether it is an individual, small group of individuals, or
another corporation. If a shareholder, however, exploits the corporation
by placing his own interests above the corporation's, then the share-
holder may be held liable under the general principles relating to piercing
the corporate veil. 16
Some commentators have suggested that policy should favor a dif-
ferent standard when considering the liability of an individual share-
holder in contrast to that of a corporate shareholder. 7 The reasons
justifying this conclusion center around the amount of potential liability
ultimately attaching to an individual shareholder. In the case of an indi-
vidual shareholder, liability is potentially unlimited, whereas in the case
of a corporate shareholder, liability is limited to that corporation-share-
holder's assets and does not reach the personal assets of the stockholder
of the corporation. 8
Some authorities appear to take a stricter look at small corporations
in piercing the corporate veil since the shareholders are usually the of-
ficers, directors, and employees of the corporation.' 9 In these situations,
an injured third party stands a greater chance of not being able to recover
on his or her claim since the corporation with which he or she has dealt
is usually severely undercapitalized, or even insolvent.20
Conversely, some commentators believe that parent-subsidiary ar-
rangements should be more closely scrutinized.2 Many times, a subsidi-
ary will be set up to operate merely as a "shell" 2 to allow the parent
corporation to escape potential tort or contract liability, including the
avoidance of debts and other obligations. This frequently occurs in the
15. Id.
16. 13A CORA M. THOMPSON, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS, § 6213, at 17 (rev. perm. ed. 1984).
17. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of A.ffiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 499, 511-12 (1976); Commentary, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Alabama: In Search of a
Standard, 35 ALA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1984).
18. Posner, supra note 17, at 512.
19. KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 41.72, at 709.
20. Id.; see Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1988).
21. LATTIN, supra note 1, § 11, at 65-66.
22. For a listing of the many various terms that are used interchangeably by the courts to
describe corporations that are not legitimate, see HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 146, at 344
n.2. "However,... we need not indulge in mere semantics, for the circumstances of each case must
justify application of the rule." National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp.
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context of environmental cleanups. For example, since the enactment of
CERCLA,23 parties who clean up hazardous waste sites often incur ex-
penses far exceeding the value of the assets of subsidiaries which dumped
the wastes.24 When these parties seek indemnification, they usually have
to look to the parent corporation.25 This presents problems from the
standpoint of interpretation of the CERCLA statutes. The complaining
party is not sure whether he can pursue his claim against the parent on a
direct liability theory, or whether he must first pierce the corporate veil
in order to reach the parent's assets.26 This situation illustrates that
piercing the corporate veil inherently generates competing policies: the
well-settled concept of limited liability to stimulate investment and econ-
omy versus the critical and immediate need for environmental
maintenance.27
B. Tort Versus Contract Actions 28
The standard for piercing the corporate veil may depend upon
whether the underlying cause of action against the corporation sounds in
contract or in tort. Typically, in contract claims, a party knows the
other party to the contract.2 9 Many authorities, therefore, assert that the
plaintiff must prove a higher degree of culpability in a contract case than
in a tort case for the court to pierce the corporate veil30 because the
plaintiff has sufficient information to make an informed choice as to
whether to deal with the corporation before entering the transaction."'
On the other hand, in tort cases courts sometimes relax the require-
ments to pierce the veil. 2 The plaintiff typically has not ascertained the
23. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act provides
for the emergency cleanup of hazardous waste sites with subsequent reimbursement from the "re-
sponsible parties" who put the wastes there. See Mark R. McPhail, Note, CERCLA Liability of
Corporate Parents for Their Dissolved or Undercapitalized Subsidiaries, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 345, 345-
46 (1991).
24. Id. at 351.
25. Id. at 352.
26. Id. at 351. Piercing the corporate veil is often difficult since each state's corporation laws
are different, and cases in which the doctrine would be applied are very fact-specific. Id. at 352-53.
Furthermore, some courts circumvent the doctrine and assess direct liability on the parent corpora-
tion as an "operator". Id. at 356, 358-59. McPhail suggests a set of uniform standards which would
make it easier to pierce the corporate veil regardless of the jurisdiction involved. See id. at 361-63.
27. Id. at 354.
28. These are not the only types of actions that involve piercing the corporate veil. See infra
part IV.C-D (bankruptcy and tax cases in Oklahoma).
29. See United States v. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Jon-T
Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985); Miles v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193 (5th
Cir. 1983).
30. Jon-T Chema, Inc., 768 F.2d at 693.
31. Id.; VanDiviner, 822 F.2d at 963-64.
32. Jon-T Chera, Inc., 768 F.2d at 693.
[Vol. 28:869
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financial condition of a corporation before, for example, buying a defec-
tive product and thus has no reason to believe the corporation is under-
capitalized or insolvent.3 3  Therefore, when the plaintiff has been
tortiously injured, out of fairness and equity the courts will consider
piercing the corporate veil to allow a recovery when the corporation can-
not satisfy the plaintiff's claim.3 4
C. Different Approaches to the Doctrine
The doctrine first developed as a means to uphold equity. Gener-
ally, a corporation will not be able to retain its distinct and separate iden-
tity when doing so will conflict with the policy that created it. While
this provides a general premise for shareholder personal liability, the
standard proved too vague and inadequate, by itself, for the already hesi-
tant courts36 to apply with any consistency.
37
Realizing the inadequacy of this standard, courts formulated supple-
mentary theories which focus upon the relationship between the share-
holder/owner and the corporation and offer a more concrete method of
analysis than vague equitable considerations.38 Courts generally have
been less reluctant to pierce the veil where they have found a high degree
of unity between the shareholder and the corporation.39 Confusion, how-
ever, has also occurred since courts have employed different terms to
33. Id.
34. Cf Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1971) (parent company was directly
and strictly liable for defective work done by a subsidiary on a truck manufactured by the parent).
Although it did not need to pierce the corporate veil to reach the parent's assets, the court used an
analysis similar to that used in veil-piercing cases. The court stated the subsidiary was not set up as
a sham (i.e. instrumentality), citing adequate capitalization and sufficient independence from the
parent. Id. at 621. Furthermore, the court did not find fraud. Yet, the court stated there was no
reason to defeat the liability of the parent when the parent controlled the subsidiary. Id. at 622.
35. D.N. & E. Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman, 6 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1931); see Kwick Set Components,
Inc. v. Davidson Indus., Inc., 411 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1982).
36. Denise L. Speer, Comment, "Piercing the Corporate Veil" in Maryland: An Analysis and
Suggested Approach, 14 BALT. L. REv. 311, 313 (1985).
Conflicting policy considerations have made courts hesitant to pierce the corporate veil.
On one hand, there is the strong policy of allowing limited liability for shareholders in
order to promote capital growth and investment. On the other hand, there is the compet-
ing interest of serving justice in a particular situation where upholding the theory of limited
liability would be inequitable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
38. John F. Dobbyn, A Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 KAN. L.
REV. 185, 186-88 (1971). Dobbyn provides a useful framework for analyzing situations to determine
whether piercing the corporate veil is necessary. The main concept is a two-level analysis, focusing
upon the relationship between the shareholder and the plaintiff, and also focusing upon the relation-
ship between the shareholder and the corporation. Id.
39. Id.
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describe the same relationship between the corporation and its share-
holders.4' Although these terms are interchangeable and the underlying
theories contain fine shades of distinction among them, the theories have
the same basic aim: to expand the inquiry to include the relationship
between the corporation and its shareholder."a
Two main concepts underlie these theories: identity and control.42
The identity theories are premised upon a unity of interest between the
corporation and its shareholder. 3 The most popular identity theory is
known as the "alter ego" rule.' The elements of the alter ego rule are:
(1) unity of interest to the degree that the separateness of the corporation
from the shareholder ceases, and (2) allowing separateness to continue
would promote fraud or injustice.45
To find an alter ego, courts examine various factors, including the
shareholder transacting business for himself in the name of the corpora-
tion, participation on the board of directors, right to corporate property,
claiming personal ownership of corporate property donated by the share-
holder, and unfettered control of corporate property.46 Critics have ar-
gued that some factors used in the alter ego rule have no relevance to the
injury of the plaintiff.47 For example, failure to issue stock, use of the
same business office and same attorney, and disregard of legal formalities
tend to show a lack of corporate individuality; nevertheless, they usually
do not have an impact upon the injury sustained by the plaintiff.48 These
factors are not an exact science, and they tend to overlap with the control
theories.
40. One particularly troubling term is agency. Under the agency theory, agency principles are
applied to hold the principal (i.e. individual or corporate shareholder) liable for the acts of its agent
(i.e. small corporation or subsidiary). The problem with this theory, note some commentators, is the
corporation can almost always be found to be the agent of the shareholder. Speer, supra note 37, at
314. Therefore, shareholders would constantly lose their protection, and the policy supporting lim-
ited liability would be contradicted. Id.; see POWELL, supra note 1, § 22, at 94; Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 271-72 (D. Del. 1989); see also CCMS Pub. Co. v. Dooley-
Maloof, Inc., 645 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Cir. 1981) (owner-shareholders were agents of corporation and
owed it a duty of not acting in conflict with corporation).
41. For a concise discussion of different theories employed by courts, see Speer, supra note 36,
at 313-23.
42. See Dobbyn, supra note 38, at 186-87.
43. Id. at 186.
44. Another theory which is very similar to the alter ego rule is termed the identity rule. 18
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 56 (1985). Courts have also equated the terms alter ego and business
conduit in their application of the rule. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Cooper Foundation, 189 F.2d
825, 830 (10th Cir. 1951).
45. Marr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 105 P.2d 649, 654 (1940).
46. Id. at 831.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/12
VEIL PIERCING IN OKLAHOMA
The "instrumentality" '49 theory, one of the most widely recognized
theories, centers around the element of shareholder control.5 Once
again, courts swap terms, making it unclear as to which theory they are
employing. Under the instrumentality theory, courts look for control,
not merely in the sense of stock ownership,"1 but in complete domina-
tion5 2 over the corporation. As with the alter ego rule, courts use several
factors to determine evidence of this requisite control needed to find an
"instrumentality." These factors, while often stated in terms of a parent-
subsidiary relationship, also apply to the other types of corporations such
as close corporations. -
Typical factors courts employ when applying the instrumentality
theory, either in their totality or in some mystical combination, include
whether: (1) the parent owns most or all of the stock of the subsidiary;
(2) the parent and subsidiary have common directors; (3) the parent fi-
nances the subsidiary; (4) the parent subscribes to the stock of the subsid-
iary or otherwise causes its incorporation; (5) the subsidiary is severely
undercapitalized; (6) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of
the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary conducts business with no one other
than its parent, and its only assets were conveyed to it by its parent; (8)
the parent describes the subsidiary as a department or division; (9) the
parent uses the property of the subsidiary as its own; (10) the directors
and officers of the subsidiary take their orders directly from the parent
with only the parent's interest in mind; and (11) legal formalities are not
observed.53
The adoption of different theories in each jurisdiction has resulted in
a doctrine which combines equitable considerations with a set of addi-
tional factors derived from one of the enumerated theories. In other
words, courts examine the plaintiff's relationship with the shareholder as
49. "Use of the term 'instrumentality' is unfortunate because all corporations are in one sense
'instrumentalities' of their stockholders." KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 43.10, at 759.
50. Dobbyn, supra note 38, at 186; Speer, supra note 36, at 315; National Bond Finance Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir.
1965).
51. If courts only looked for evidence of control in stock ownership, all sole-shareholder and
other close corporations would automatically become instrumentalities. However, courts usually
apply the instrumentality theory to both parent-subsidiary arrangements and individual owners. See
Messick v. Moring, 514 So. 2d 892, 894 (Ala. 1987) (another corporation or individual may be
dominating party).
52. "[A]n analysis of domination may be properly limited to control over the particular transac-
tion attacked." KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 43, at 732 (emphasis added).
53. See POWELL, supra note 1, § 6.
1993]
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well as the shareholder's relationship with the corporation. 54 For exam-
ple, a jurisdiction might examine the requisite elements of (1) instrumen-
tality, through control or complete domination; (2) use of control for
fraud or other improper purposes; and 3) proximate cause, in considering
whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.55
III. ANALYSIS OF THE OKLAHOMA DOCTRINE
A. Oklahoma's General Policy
Oklahoma has long recognized the doctrine of limited liability of
shareholders of corporations 5l as well as the doctrine of piercing the cor-
porate veil. 7 When Oklahoma courts pierce the corporate veil, it is not a
total and permanent disregard for the corporate entity; rather, it is a dis-
regard for a limited purpose, namely to redress the injured plaintiff.5" In
applying Oklahoma's standards, piercing the corporate veil involves
questions of fact such as whether a corporation is an instrumentality 9
and/or the determination of fraud or injustice.6 ° Oklahoma also follows
the general policy that the corporate entity will not be disregarded for the
benefit, either substantive6 1 or procedural," of a shareholder.61 How-
ever, there are instances where Oklahoma will "quasi-pierce" the corpo-
rate veil for the purpose of giving the injured plaintiff personal
54. Dobbyn, supra note 38, at 187.
55. See National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 255 (W.D. Mo.
1964); Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc., 753 P.2d 897, 900 (N.M. 1988). Unlike Oklahoma, some
jurisdictions have embodied the veil-pericing concept into their corporate statutory framework. See,
e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21, § A(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993).
56. Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447, 451 (Okla. 1967); Buckner v. Dillard, 89 P.2d 326, 329
(Okla. 1939); Garrett v. Downing, 90 P.2d 636, 638 (Okla. 1939); Hearn v. Petra Int'l Corp., 710
P.2d 769, 770 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985). See generally Oklahoma General Corp. Act, OKLA. STAT. tit.
18, § 1001 et. seq. (1991).
57. Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1969); Buckner, 80 P.2d
at 329.
"The privilege of doing business in corporate form is granted by statute. This privilege carries
many benefits including the limits on personal liability to the stockholders [sic] investment. One
cannot simultaneously claim the benefits of corporate form and escape the liabilities of that insula-
tion." Mainford v. Sharp, 569 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
58. Mainford, 569 P.2d at 548 n.2.
59. Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Okla. City, 524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975).
60. Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1379 (10th Cir. 1980); Edgar, 524 F.2d at
166.
61. Love v. Flour Mills of America, 647 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (10th Cir. 1981) (worker's com-
pensation case where defendant/parent attempted to disregard its separateness from its subsidiary in
order to gain immunity from tort claims); DeBoer Const., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 486,
496 (10th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff/shareholder trying to disregard separateness of its affiliate corporation
in order to recover affiliate's damages).
62. Mainford, 569 P.2d at 548 (plaintiff/shareholder attempted to pierce corporate veil so that
it could maintain action as real party in interest against defendant/customer for monies due).
63. However, Oklahoma has pierced the corporate veil of a plaintiff corporation, on its own
8
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jurisdiction over all of the defendants."
B. Oklahoma's Adoption of the Doctrine
Oklahoma initially applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil by solely relying upon equitable considerations. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma first recognized the doctrine in Bluejacket State Bank v.
First National Bank of Bluejacket.65 The court stated that "[w]henever
necessary for the interests of the public... courts will disregard this legal
fiction.... 66 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in applying
Oklahoma law, specifically recognized Oklahoma's doctrine in Dunnett v.
Am.67 In Dunnett, the court articulated the justifications that would be
used thereafter in piercing the corporate veil: "the [c]orporate entity may
be disregarded where not to do so will defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.' 68
initiative, to the detriment of the plaintiff. See Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assoc. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 605 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1979) (court applying clean-hands doctrine to plaintiff cor-
poration where its shareholders were guilty of same acts charged against defendant).
64. See Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (10th Cir.
1990) (court considered relationship of shareholder and corporation and validity of separateness in
granting personal jurisdiction over foreign shareholder/defendant); Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D.
25, 29-31 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (court applied same factors as those used to determine "instrumental-
ity," or relationship between shareholder and corporation, in granting personal jurisdiction over a
foreign subsidiary where parent's acts, doing business in Oklahoma, were imputed to foreign subsidi-
ary). But see Glenny v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 1974) (court
refused to pierce corporate veil for plaintiffs for sole reason of satisfying diversity requirement for
federal court jurisdiction); KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 1, § 41.90, at 715.
65. 9 P.2d 2 (Okla. 1932).
66. Id. at 4 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A vague recognition of the equitable consider-
ations was also stated by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit one year earlier in Maloney
Tank Manuf. Co. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum, 49 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1931). The court of appeals
stated that "[t]he doctrine of corporate entity may be disregarded if it is apparent that a wrongdoer
is undertaking to use it to play hide and seek with an injured party." Id. at 150.
67. 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934).
68. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). Note: the Dunnett court incorrectly cites Maloney Tank
Manuf Co. on this proposition. E.g., Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041, 1043
(10th Cir. 1969); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying Colorado law); Palmer v.
Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674, 681 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Buckner v. Dillard, 89 P.2d 326, 329 (Okla.
1939); In re Estate of Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
Many cases subsequent to Dunnett state the same idea in a slightly different fashion. See Key v.
Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1990) ("detrimental to the public good, justifies
wrong, or protects fraud"); In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1979) ("fraud or
injustice"); Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Okla. City, Inc., 524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir.
1975) ("fraud or illegal or inequitable conduct"); Robertson, 411 F.2d at 1043 ("defeat public con-
venience .... justify wrong ... to perpetrate fraud whether actual or implied, or ... to defend
crime"); Selected Invs. Corp. v. Duncan, 260 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 1958) ("prevent fraud, injus-
tice, or wrong"); Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. Cooper Foundation, 189 F.2d 825, 830 (10th Cir.
1951) ("bring about a fraud upon third parties"); Continental Oil v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 562 (10th
Cir. 1940) ("work fraud or injustice"); Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cimarron Exploration Co., 564 F.
Supp. 840, 853 (W.D. Okla. 1981) ("do wrong, perpetrate fraud, or commit a crime"); Rea v. An-
Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 29 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ("promote fraud or illegality or injustice"); Miller &
Miller Auctioneers, Inc. v. Mersch, 442 F. Supp. 570, 577 (W.D. Okla. 1977) ("fraud and illegal
9
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Due to Oklahoma's initial reliance on equitable concepts, the doc-
trine was vague. This pervasive ambiguity is illustrated in Sautbine v.
Keller,69 where the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants and their
wholly owned "family" corporation were one and the same and, there-
fore, the corporate veil should be pierced.70 The plaintiffs argued that
application of the doctrine should be expanded beyond the situation of
doing wrong, perpetrating a fraud, or committing a crime,71 and urged
the doctrine should also apply in cases where it is necessary to "protect
rights of third persons and accomplish justice."72
The court did not find the plaintiffs' claim persuasive based on the
evidence they presented but, by implication, the court stated that the veil
could be pierced without a showing of fraud.73 In other words, the cor-
porate entity could be disregarded merely to protect third party rights
and accomplish justice. However, it appears that the court would only
do so where the relationship between the shareholder and the corpora-
tion was close enough to be practically identical or controlling. It is not
clear what the court's requirements were to successfully prove these gen-
eral equitable standards, although the court did state that the plaintiffs'
allegedly injured rights must be vested.74 The court was apparently try-
ing to weed out speculative claims by equating the protection of a vested
right with the protection of third party rights and the accomplishment of
justice.
C. Evolution of the Doctrine in Oklahoma
The equitable standards that developed during the first half of this
century proved to be inadequate. Courts could not uniformly apply these
ambiguous standards to each type of case and obtain consistent and fair
results.75 Therefore, courts applying Oklahoma law adopted the instru-
mentality theory to help clarify and bolster the doctrine.
action and in the interest of justice and to do equity"); Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 768 P.2d 891, 892 (Okla. 1989) ("fraud or injustice"); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v.
Goforth, 143 P.2d 154, 157 (Okla. 1943) ("Both law and equity, when necessary to circumvent
fraud, protect the rights of third persons, and accomplish justice, disregard the distinct existence and
treat them as identical"); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 61 P.2d 645, 648 (Okla.
1936) ("design or scheme to perpetrate a fraud"); Mainford v. Sharp, 569 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1977) ("defeat public interests by protecting fraud, defending crime, or perpetration of other
wrong").
69. 423 P.2d 447 (Okla. 1967).
70. Id. at 450.
71. Id. at 451.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 453.
74. Id.
75. See generally Dobbyn, supra note 38.
[Vol. 28:869
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/12
1993] VEIL PIERCING IN OKLAHOMA
1. The Instrumentality Theory
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma first recognized the instrumental-
ity theory with equitable considerations 76 in Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab
Taxi & Baggage.7 7 The court stated where "the separate corporate exist-
ence is a design or scheme to perpetrate a fraud, or... that one corpora-
tion is so organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted that it is
merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation" the corpo-
rate veil would be pierced.78 The concept underlying the instrumentality
theory is control, and although other courts in other cases have varied
the language in their opinions, the concept and the objectives remain the
same.79 In applying the instrumentality theory, courts consider several
76. It appears that Oklahoma has wavered back and forth among theories in the past. For
example, in Warner Bros. Theatres the court applied the alter ego rule and accompanying factors to
the defendant corporation. Also, courts are constantly interchanging terms. Eg., In re Estate of
Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 898 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (the court discusses domination and control to find
an alter ego in the same sentence). However, it is clear today that in Oklahoma the instrumentality
theory is consistently used.
77. 61 P.2d 645 (Okla. 1936). The first hint at the concept of control, which underlies the
instrumentality theory, was gleaned from the court in St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Sanford, 153 P. 650
(Okla. 1915). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that one company does not automatically
become liable for the negligence of another by mere reason of stock ownership. Id. However, where
one company also controls the other company in its daily operations and treats itself and the other
company as one, then the corporate entity may be disregarded. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Wallace, 61 P.2d at 648 (emphasis added). In Wallace, the plaintiff sustained personal
injuries after she was run over by a cab. Id. at 646. She sued the cab company only to find out that
it had no assets; rather, it was owned and controlled by another cab company. Id. The court pierced
the veil to allow her to proceed on her tort claim against the second corporation. Id. at 649. In
determining that the corporation was an instrumentality, the court examined several factors very
similar to the Fish factors. See infra part III.C.2 (discussing Fish factors). For example, the court
ascertained the identity of the stockholders, directors, employees, and corporate property to deter-
mine who was in control. Id. at 647.
The instrumentality theory with equitable considerations stated in Wallace has been consist-
ently used by both the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
See Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Okla. City, Inc., 524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975);
Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 288 (Okla. 1989); Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State, 360 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1961);
Gibson Products Co. v. Murphy, 100 P.2d 453, 458 (Okla. 1940).
79. For eases that have a slight variation on the Wallace rule, see In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593
F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1979) ("mere instrumentality or alter ego of the bankrupt corporation, with
no independent existence of its own"); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 562 (10th Cir.
1940) ("dominating and controlling it [the corporation] in such manner and to such extent that it
becomes the mere agency or instrumentality of the parent"); In re Sooner Oil & Gas, 24 B.R. 479,
483 (W.D. Okla. 1982) ("one corporation is so organized and controlled and its business conducted
in such a manner as to make it merely an agency, instrumentality, adjunct, or alter ego of another
corporation"); Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cimarron Exploration Co., 564 F. Supp. 840, 853 (W.D.
Okla. 1981) (court says it's applying alter ego theory but cites cases that apply instrumentality rule);
Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 29 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ("one corporation is so organized and
controlled and its business conducted in such a manner as to make it merely an agency, instrumen-
tality, adjunct, or alter ego of another corporation"); Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
768 P.2d 891, 892 (Okla. 1989) ("subsidiary or affiliate companies function entirely as instrumentali-
ties or adjuncts of the parent"); In re Estate of Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 898 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) ("so
dominated the corporation as to be liable for its acts as an alter ego").
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factors. Unfortunately, many times the court does not actually state
whether these factors are directly related to a determination of instru-
mentality, 0 or if they are equitable considerations,"1 or both. 2
2. The Fish v. East Factors
Courts applying Oklahoma law in piercing the corporate veil have
consistently applied factors enumerated in Fish v. East.s3 The factors
that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit used in Fish, as adopted
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, were:
(1) The parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock
of the subsidiary. (2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have
common directors or officers. (3) The parent corporation finances the
subsidiary. (4) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital
stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation. (5) The
subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital. (6) The parent corporation
pays the salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary. (7) The sub-
sidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corpora-
tion or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation.
(8) In the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its
officers, "the subsidiary" is referred to as such or as a department or
division. (9) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act
independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take direction from
the parent corporation. (10) The formal legal requirements of the sub-
sidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not observed.84
While Oklahoma courts do not decide cases on certain combinations
80. See Harry D. Chambers, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil in New Mexico: Scott v. AZL
Resources, Inc., 21 N.M. L. REV. 429, 433-38 (1991). "Instrumentality has been recognized as the
most difficult element of the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil." Id. at 433.
81. Id. at 433-38.
82. See CCMS Pub. Co. v. Dooley-Maloof, Inc., 645 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Cir. 1981); Oklahoma
Retail Grocers Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 605 F.2d 1155, 1157-59 (10th Cir. 1979); Robertson v.
Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1969); Selected Invs. Corp. v. Duncan, 260
F.2d 918, 920-21 (10th Cir. 1958); In re Estate of Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Okla. Ct. App.
1991); Hearn v. Petra Int'l Corp., 710 P.2d 769, 770-71 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
83. 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940). Fish involved a bankrupt parent corporation which diverted
assets to its subsidiary in an attempt to hinder and delay creditors. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
expressly adopted Fish in Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 288 (Okla. 1989).
For federal cases that apply the Fish factors, see, for example, Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906
F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1990); Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012,
1018 (10th Cir. 1990); Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1980);
Gulfco Inv. Corp. v. Hogan, 593 F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658, 662
(N.D. Okla. 1985); Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Okla. 1966).
It is important to note that courts in several Oklahoma cases have not cited Fish, but they have
nevertheless implicitly used one or more factors from the exhaustive list in justifying piercing the
veil. These cases typically cite the more vague rule in Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage,
61 P.2d 645 (Okla. 1936). The ultimate objectives of both the Fish rule and the Wallace rule, how-
ever, appear to be the same.
84. Fish, 114 F.2d at 191.
[Vol. 28:869
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of factors with regularity, courts have stated which factors will not, by
themselves, constitute an instrumentality. For example, stock owner-
ship, even one hundred percent, is not enough to deem a corporation an
instrumentality."5 In addition, in the case of parent-subsidiary arrange-
ments and affiliated corporations, the commonality of directors and of-
ficers of the two or more entities is not, alone, enough to create an
instrumentality. 6 On the other hand, courts will take a close look at the
capitalization of a corporation; if the corporation is intentionally under-
capitalized, personal liability is likely to be imposed. 7
The reason for some of these policies is obvious. In the case of a
small corporation, almost invariably the stockholder(s) own all the stock
and are directors, officers, and employees. In the case of a parent-subsid-
iary arrangement, many times there will be common directors, officers,
and employees. Therefore, these corporations would always be deemed
instrumentalities in the absence of such rules. It can also be readily seen
that a shareholder, whether it be an individual or another corporation,
who inadequately capitalizes a corporation is creating a grossly unfair
situation for an injured plaintiff who had no knowledge of the value of
the company but relied upon an assumption that he or she was dealing
with a legitimate entity. 8
D. The Current Oklahoma Doctrine: The Piercing Rule
The equitable considerations and the instrumentality theory are the
85. Key, 906 F.2d at 504; Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Okla. City, Inc., 524 F.2d
162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975); Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir.
1969); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 562 (10th Cir. 1940); Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Electric Co., 96 F.2d 693, 705 (10th Cir. 1938); Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 29 (W.D. Okla.
1978); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Sanford, 153 P. 650, 653 (Okla. 1915).
However, Oklahoma courts have pierced the veil where sole ownership (instrumentality factor)
was coupled with a wrongful purpose (equitable consideration). Although other factors are also
technically satisfied such as same owner, director, officer, and employee, this will usually be the case
where a corporation is closely held. Compare Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cimarron Exploration
Co., 564 F. Supp. 840, 853-54 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (court found sole owner who was also sole officer,
director, and employee liable where he had wrongfully diverted funds) with Robertson v. Roy L.
Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1969) (court found sole owner of corporation not
liable where he did no wrong).
86. Key, 906 F.2d at 504; Taylor, 96 F.2d at 705; Rea, 79 F.R.D. at 29; Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow
Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 61 P.2d 645, 648 (Okla. 1936).
87. See Wallace, 61 P.2d at 647. Other jurisdictions agree with this, including the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Undercapitalization may also imply improper or wrongful purpose; see also Chambers, supra
note 80, at 436-37. But, some jurisdictions will not use this against the corporation if the plaintiff
was not injured by the corporation's undercapitalization. Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259, 264
(Mass. 1937).
88. One can see, from this example, the persistent overlap of the instrumentality theory with
equitable considerations: an instrumentality factor, undercapitalization, equated with an equitable
consideration, gross unfairness.
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components comprising the current Oklahoma doctrine, the "piercing"
rule.89 The first component examines whether there is control amount-
ing to complete domination not only of finances, but also of business
policy and operations.9" The second component examines whether the
corporation was used for an improper purpose9 1 or to commit fraud or
other wrong.92
Oklahoma conducts this two-part test on a case-by-case basis.93
First, the court focuses upon the relationship between the shareholder
and the corporation94 and tries to determine whether the corporation is a
mere instrumentality of the shareholder, applying at least one of the Fish
factors.9" Next, the court analyzes the relationship between the plaintiff
and the corporation.96 When focusing upon this relationship, the court
looks for evidence of fraud, unfairness, other wrong, or the need to pro-
tect a vested right in the plaintiff.97 These are equitable considerations.
The application of the two-part test is illustrated in Key v. Liquid Energy
Corp.98 In considering whether to pierce the corporate veil of the subsid-
iary to reach the parent corporation, the court first determined whether
the subsidiary was an instrumentality of the parent.99 The court affirmed
that Fish v. East was the rule used by the Tenth Circuit in applying
Oklahoma law and was consistent with Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sions as well."°° The plaintiffs could not produce evidence to show any
89. Identification of the two components involves questions of fact. See Luckett v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1379 (10th Cir. 1980); Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Okla.
City, Inc., 524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
90. This is the instrumentality theory. See supra part III.C.
91. These are the equitable considerations. See supra part III.B.
92. National Bond Finance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 253 (W.D. Mo.
1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965).
93. See generally Dobbyn, supra note 38.
94. For example, the corporation (of the shareholder) is an instrumentality, alter ego, adjunct,
etc. While the courts loosely use these terms, the court is looking for evidence of control, or of unity
of interest by virtue of control.
95. The Fish factors are used whether the shareholder is an individual or another corporation
although the courts are usually not very clear about application of the instrumentality theory to
individual shareholders.
96. See generally Dobbyn, supra note 38.
97. Fraud does not always have to be proven. If an instrumentality can be shown, the applica-
tion of the equitable standards may only require a showing of a need for equity to protect the rights
of third persons and accomplish justice. See Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447, 452 (Okla. 1967) (by
implication); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Goforth, 143 P.2d 154, 157 (Okla. 1943) (no fraud
shown).
98. 906 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1990). In Key, the plaintiffs were employees who were negligently
injured by their employer, Liquid Energy, which was a subsidiary. Id. at 502. The plaintiffs sought
to hold the parent liable for the negligence of its subsidiary by piercing the corporate veil of the
subsidiary. Id.
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id.
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factors beyond stock ownership and commonality of directors, and this
was not enough to prove an instrumentality.10 ' Finding also that the
plaintiffs could offer no evidence showing detriment to the public good,
fraud, or other wrong, the court refused to pierce the veil."0 z
IV. OKLAHOMA SCENARIOS
Four major types of veil-piercing scenarios have arisen in
Oklahoma: (1) the third party plaintiff versus the closely-held corpora-
tion in a contract or tort action, including a sole owner, a family corpora-
tion, and affiliated corporations commonly owned by a few or a single
individual; (2) the third party plaintiff versus the parent-subsidiary ar-
rangement in a contract or tort action; (3) a corporation in bankruptcy;
and (4) a corporation attempting to escape tax liability.
A. Close Corporations
In Oklahoma, the most prevalent type of piercing involves the close
corporation. Oklahoma clearly grants limited liability to this type of cor-
poration without regard to its number of shareholders.1 0 3 Typically, in
the context of a close corporation Oklahoma pierces the veil because
owner(s) are either freely commingling assets" * or avoiding debt by us-
ing the corporation as a shield.105 Oklahoma will pierce the veil where
necessary, as illustrated in Home-Stake Production Co. v. Talon Petro-
leum, CA. 106
Home-Stake illustrates the application of the piercing rule, particu-
larly the instrumentality theory, to an individual owner whose corpora-
tions were liable for several debts.107 The court examined several factors
101. Id. at 504. The only evidence produced was a sign at the plant indicating that Liquid
Energy was a subsidiary and a common mailing address for the parent and subsidiary. Id.
102. Id. The court stated that it would not decide whether both components must be met (in-
strumentality and equitable considerations); rather, the court stated it was not necessary to deter-
mine the necessity of proving both components in this case since the plaintiffs could satisfy neither
test. Id. at 504 n.1.
103. See, e.g., Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447, 451 (Okla. 1967); Garrett v. Downing, 90 P.2d
636, 637-38 (Okla. 1939).
104. See Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cimarron Exploration Co., 564 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla.
1981).
105. See Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Goforth, 143 P.2d 154 (Okla. 1943).
106. 907 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1990).
107. Although the individual owner, Tudela, was not actually held personally liable through the
use of the piercing rule in this case, the court did pierce the veil for the purpose of gaining personal
jurisdiction over Tudela. The court stated that a finding of instrumentality alone was enough to
pierce the veil (i.e. impute the corporations' contacts with the state to their owner, Tudela). Id. at
1018 (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981)). The court
stated, however, that it would be necessary to find both an instrumentality and a design or scheme to
1993]
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to determine if these corporations were mere instrumentalities of the in-
dividual defendant.108 Although the court did not elaborate upon the
equitable considerations, it did mention that "a design or scheme to per-
petrate a fraud" must also be shown.'0 9 Unfortunately, the court mis-
stated the Oklahoma doctrine as it had previously been interpreted by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court." 0 However, the Home-Stake rule is con-
sistent with a recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decision."'
It is clear that in the situation of a close corporation, courts are
more apt to focus on equitable considerations than the instrumentality
theory. This is clearly illustrated in Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Cimarron
Exploration Co.," 2 wherein the owner of a corporation wrongfully di-
verted funds received by it for personal gain.I" In its analysis, the court
merely glossed over the instrumentality theory" 4 and stated that "if the
corporate existence is used to do wrong, perpetrate fraud, or commit a
crime... the individual shareholder may be held personally liable.""'
The court further stated that wrongfully diverting funds for personal
gain satisfies this rule." 6 However, the only support the court gave for
its rationale - alluding to Fish factors - was that such activity was
wrong, and that the sole shareholder was also the sole officer, director,
and employee of the corporation.' 17 Nevertheless, Stoltz demonstrates
that in the situation of a close corporation, courts tend to place more
importance upon equitable considerations than they do the instrumental-
ity theory. Perhaps, this is because courts believe that control by a sole
shareholder practically implies instrumentality and, therefore, courts
perpetrate a fraud to pierce the veil for the purpose of imposing personal liability on Tudela. Id.
(emphasis added).
108. Id. While the court did not expressly use the Fish factors, it considered five factors which
were similar to those used in Fish, and it cited Fish. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court in Home-Stake stated that both instrumentality and fraud must be shown to
pierce the veil. Id. The court supported its statement by citing Hulme v. Springfield Life Ins. Co.
(which cites Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oklahoma). In Gulf Oil Corp., however, the court stated the two-
component test with an or, not an and. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Oklahoma, 360 P.2d 933, 936 (Okla.
1961).
111. See Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 768 P.2d 891, 892 (Okla. 1989) (both
components of the piercing rule must be met).
112. 564 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1981). In Stoltz Wagner & Brown, a corporation was formed
by its sole owner for the purpose of entering into certain oil and gas agreements. Id. at 854. The
corporation was supposed to forward funds in the amount of $225,000 from one party to another in
connection with these agreements. Id. at 843.
113. Id. at 853.
114. Actually, the court termed it the alter ego theory.
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should expressly focus upon whether the plaintiff was wrongfully injured
by the defendant.
B. Parent-Subsidiary Arrangements
Frequently, situations arise in Oklahoma wherein a third party, such
as a customer or an employee, has been injured by the acts of a subsidi-
ary. In these cases, the plaintiff will sometimes look toward the parent
corporation to pay its judgment, particularly if the parent corporation set
up the subsidiary with few assets available to pay a judgment.
In Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,11 for example, the plaintiffs
sued both Bethlehem Singapore and its parent, Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion. 119 The plaintiffs argued that the subsidiary was merely an instru-
mentality of the parent, as evidenced by the management, technical
services, and sales agreements between the two entities.12 The plaintiffs
further argued that these agreements indicated a "maximum degree of
control" over the subsidiary.'2 1 In applying the instrumentality theory,
the court acknowledged the legitimacy of the Fish factors and examined
the evidence presented in light of these factors.'22 The evidence indi-
cated that the parent indirectly owned seventy percent of the stock of the
subsidiary and that the parent supplied ten managers to its subsidiary,
many of whom were also employed by the parent.123 Furthermore, the
contracts and negotiations between the plaintiff's employer and the sub-
sidiary were all carried on through the parent office, and the parent dom-
inated the decision-making.124 Even with this seemingly strong evidence
against the defendant, the court found most of the Fish factors had not
been met and, therefore, the subsidiary was not an instrumentality of the
parent. 125
The court next considered equitable justifications for piercing the
veil, stating that it would disregard the corporate entity where fraud or
inequitable conduct results from the use of corporate structures. 126 The
plaintiffs argued that injustice would occur since a judgment would be
118. 618 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. The injured plaintiff was supervising the loading of drilling equipment onto a drilling rig
when a crane cable snapped, seriously injuring him. Id. at 1376. The plaintiffs sued on a theory of
negligence. Id.
120. Id. at 1377.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1378.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1378-79.
126. Id. at 1379.
19931
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difficult to enforce against the subsidiary, and the plaintiffs would have to
sue the subsidiary in Singapore.1 27 The court responded by stating that it
had not found any evidence of fraud or inequitable conduct. 28 It did not
believe the difficulty of enforcing a judgment or the inconvenience of
maintaining a suit in a foreign country would amount to inequity to the
plaintiff. 129
C. Bankruptcy Cases
In a bankruptcy proceeding, it is sometimes necessary to disregard
corporate entities for the benefit of creditors.130 A typical case involves a
corporation formed by an individual, or a subsidiary formed by a parent,
for the sole purpose of raising funds and hindering and delaying credi-
tors. 13  However, sometimes it is detrimental to the creditors of a corpo-
ration to have a court pierce the corporate veil.132 At any rate, when a
court decides to pierce the corporate veil in a bankruptcy proceeding, it
consults state law.' 33 Thus, Oklahoma's piercing rule is used in the ap-
propriate situations.134
In bankruptcy situations, courts applying Oklahoma law have con-
sistently followed Oklahoma's piercing rule, using the same instrumen-
tality factors as those used in Fish.'15  In applying the equitable
127. Id. at 1378.
128. Id. at 1379.
129. Id. The court applied the two-component test, but it did not explain which component
might have been more important. The court merely looked at the applicability of the two compo-
nents to the facts and concluded that the parent could not be liable on the theory that its subsidiary
was its instrumentality. Id. This illustrates the lack of precision inherent in court opinions which
leaves a trail of confusion for plaintiffs and corporate counsel.
130. See, eg., Selected Invs. Corp. v. Duncan, 260 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1958) (injustice to inves-
tor creditors if veil not pierced between corporation and its trust fund in a reorganization plan where
funds siphoned out of trust for personal use of corporate owners); In re Sooner Oil & Gas Corp., 24
B.R. 479 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982) (injustice to creditor if veil not pierced where defendant would
defeat security interest with creditor, having assigned collateral to another corporation solely owned
by him); see also Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940); In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1985).
131. In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985) (individual organized affiliates); Fish,
114 F.2d 177 (parent formed subsidiary). For an example of another type of situation, see In re
Fitzgerald, De Arman & Roberts, Inc., 129 B.R. 652 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
132. See, e.g., In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979) (injustice to creditors if
corporate entities disregarded as result of increased competition of claims against estate).
133. Selected Invs Corp., 260 F.2d at 920.
134. It is important to note that a bankruptcy court does not automatically obtain jurisdiction
over a subsidiary's assets in an attempt to enlarge the parent debtor's estate. The court has jurisdic-
tion over the parent's assets, including its stock in the subsidiary. However, the court does obtain
the requisite jurisdiction over the subsidiary's assets once it has pierced the corporate veil under state
law. See In re Tonkawa Refining Co., 502 F.2d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1974).
135. See, eg., In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d at 928-29; Selected Invs. Corp., 260 F.2d at 921;
Fish 114 F.2d at 191.
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considerations in a consolidation proceeding, courts consider injustice
that could result to creditors if a consolidation were ordered in a reor-
ganization plan. 136 In other words, courts weigh the equities to see if
ordering a consolidation of entities would do more harm to the creditors
than allowing the corporate entity to remain separate, keeping potential
assets out of creditors' reach.137 Thus, it appears the equitable justifica-
tions, here, are modified since the court is weighing the harm resulting
from the defendant's actions against the harm resulting from the court's
actions to consolidate.
D. Tax Cases
"Taxes cannot be escaped 'by anticipatory arrangements and con-
tracts however skillfully devised.., by which the fruits are attributed to
a different tree from that on which they grew.' "138 Piercing the corpo-
rate veil has been a useful tool for collecting tax revenues due in
Oklahoma cases. This has proven true whether the taxes involved are
Oklahoma franchise taxes, 139 Oklahoma unemployment taxes,14° excise
taxes,1 41 or federal income taxes.142
Once again, in applying the piercing rule, courts apply Oklahoma
law, 143 including the instrumentality theory and the equitable considera-
tions. For example, in Continental Oil Co. v. Jones," the court acknowl-
edged the limited liability rule in relation to tax matters as well the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.145 The court recognized the in-
strumentality theory and the equitable considerations, and it proceeded
to apply numerous factors similar to those enumerated in Fish. 46 In
136. A bankruptcy court may, under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), consolidate corporations when assets
and liabilities are treated as owned and incurred by one entity. When a court consolidates two or
more entities, it disregards the corporate entity under state-law principles. See, e.g., In re Gulfco
Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 923 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1985); see also In re Moran Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 130 B.R. 588 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1991).
137. Compare In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. at 663 (court found prejudice to creditors far outweighed
by greater potential prejudice if consolidation not ordered) with In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d at
928-30 (reluctance to consolidate for fear of creating unfair situation for creditors who dealt with
debtor not knowing of relationship with others, versus general equitable principle that a parent can-
not dominate a subsidiary to escape liability to its creditors).
138. Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 563 (10th Cir. 1940) (citation omitted).
139. Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 768 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1989).
140. Gibson Products Co. v. Murphy, 100 P.2d 453, 455 (Okla. 1940).
141. Continental Oil Co., 113 F.2d at 558.
142. Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1979).
143. See, eg., Tulsa Tribune Co., 768 P.2d at 894 (court referred to piercing rule used in an
earlier decision not involving tax issues).
144. 113 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1940).
145. Id. at 561-62. In Continental Oil Co., the parent was transferring most of its inventory,
subject to federal excise taxes, to its subsidiaries who were not subject to the tax. Id. at 558-59.
146. Id. at 562.
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stating the instrumentality theory, the court referred to stock ownership
in that ownership alone in a normal manner would not trigger the rule;
however, ownership used "for the purpose of dominating and controlling
it [the subsidiary] in such a manner... that it becomes the mere...
instrumentality of the parent" would fulfil the requirements of the in-
strumentality theory.1 47 In recognizing the equitable justifications, the
court made it clear that fraud or illegality were not necessary to invoke
the rule; a showing that the configuration or transaction was done in
consideration of tax consequences was all that was required. 148
Similarly, in federal income tax cases the doctrine of limited liabil-
ity, even in the case of a single shareholder, and the contrasting doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil have been acknowledged in cases such as
Dolese v. United States.149 In Dolese, the taxpayer was the sole owner of
a corporation that was paying his personal expenses.150 The court im-
pliedly applied the instrumentality theory, focusing on the issue of corpo-
rate formalities, stating that "gross abuse of the formal distinction.., by
ignoring formalities and commingling personal and corporate funds, will
require allocation of income and taxation as if there were no corpora-
tion." '151 The court applied the equitable considerations by implication:
"[ilf a sole owner could have his living expenses paid by the corporation
as a loan, using his control of the entity to postpone repayment indefi-
nitely, a loophole would be created." '152 Courts, then, loosely apply the
equitable considerations since it is not difficult to show that the defend-
ant was considering tax consequences or creating a loophole. Tax cases,
therefore, appear to recognize an easier standard for piercing the corpo-
rate veil than do non-tax cases.
V. PROBLEMS WITH OKLAHOMA'S APPROACH
Oklahoma's failure to uniformly apply the piercing rule has led to
uncertainty and confusion concerning the doctrine of piercing the corpo-
rate veil.1 3 Oklahoma courts apparently do not apply both components
147. Id.; see also Tulsa Tribune Co., 768 P.2d at 895 (Okla. 1989) (quoting Continental Oil Co.).
148. Continental Oil Co., 113 F.2d at 564.
149. 605 F.2d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1979).
150. Id. at 1147.
151. Id. at 1154.
152. Id. (emphasis added). The words control and loophole refer to an instrumentality and an
unfair or inequitable advantage, respectively.
153. Oklahoma's adoption in 1986 of most of the General Corporation Law of the State of Dela.
ware may have sparked some uncertainty regarding Oklahoma's future approach to veil piercing.
Commentators have noted that Oklahoma's absence of case law interpreting the new statutory
framework will encourage Oklahoma courts to apply Delaware law in their interpretation of the new
provisions. See New Okla. General Corp. Act, Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, Pub. No. 224 (Fall 1986) at A-
[Vol. 28:869
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of the piercing rule equally or consistently to parent-subsidiary arrange-
ments and close corporations. For example, in close corporation cases
the courts might sometimes mention the word instrumentality, but then
appear to only utilize the vague equitable considerations.15 4 Courts ap-
parently view close corporations as inherent instrumentalities by virtue
of their closeness.155
Courts have also held that fraud is not a necessary finding under the
equitable considerations; rather, finding a defeat of public convenience or
some kind of inequity is sufficient to meet the equitable standards.
Courts have even implied that equitable standards could be met merely
by showing a need to protect the rights of third parties and accomplish
justice. Effectively, then, the corporate veil of a close corporation is
much easier to pierce. Almost any claim, therefore, could potentially
impose unlimited liability on an investor of a close corporation.
Furthermore, parent-subsidiary cases also lack uniformity. In Fra-
zier v. Bryan Memorial Hospital Authority,156 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma implied that application of equitable standards was unneces-
sary; rather, the instrumentality theory was, alone, sufficient to pierce the
veil.' 57 However, in Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Oklahoma,'58 the court re-
quired a showing of both an instrumentality and fraud or injustice.159 To
further muddy the waters, in Key v. Liquid Energy Corp.,1I' the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that it was not even necessary to
6, E-l, G-2 to G-3. However, it is unclear whether Oklahoma courts will apply Delaware's veil-
piercing doctrine. As an equitable doctrine, the piercing rules are not (and never have been) embod-
ied in Oklahoma's statutory framework, and Oklahoma already maintains a body of case law ad-
dressing the doctrine. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited a Delaware case in one of its recent
decisions, it gave no explanation for its use of the case, nor did it imply the application of Delaware
law. See Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 282, 288 n.35 (Okla. 1989).
A Delaware federal court has stated that there is effectively no difference between Oklahoma
and Delaware veil-piercing law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D.
Del. 1989).
154. See In re Estate of Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); Sautbine v. Keller, 423
P.2d 447, 452 (Okla. 1967). This is also true for federal courts' application of Oklahoma law. See
Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan, Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1969).
155. But see Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir.
1990) (court did not take instrumentality for granted in close corporation setting; rather, it applied
factors in determining validity of instrumentality theory). Home-Stake illustrates the inconsistency
in the category of close corporations since, here, the court stated that both components of the pierc-
ing rule must be met.
156. 775 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1989).
157. Id. at 288.
158. 768 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1989).
159. Id. at 892. Even more perplexing is the fact that the Oklahoma Supreme Court misstated
its own interpretation of the piercing rule, referring to its decision in Gulf Oil. It should be noted
that the holding in Tulsa Tribune applied to the imposition of franchise taxes and may not necessar-
ily apply to other types of situations.
160. 906 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1989).
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show whether one or both components of the piercing rule had to be
met.161 Clearly, the inconsistent use of the doctrine has left both practi-
tioners and courts bewildered.
Another problem inherent in the courts' decisions is that, when ap-
plying the instrumentality rule, courts still use terms such as instrumen-
tality and alter ego interchangeably, further increasing the confusion.
Courts have also not clarified which combinations of or how many in-
strumentality factors are necessary to consistently find an instrumental-
ity. It seems that the courts merely use the factors to "bootstrap" their
decisions of whether to pierce the corporate veil.
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation for the lack of clarity in
Oklahoma's piercing rule is that the rule's origins are in equity. As such,
it is difficult to compose a framework or model that may be applied to
every type of situation. Therefore, when courts articulate factors and
label theories differently, they really do not add much to the law of veil-
piercing. Ultimately, courts will do as they see fit to maintain equity,
depending upon the facts of each case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, Oklahoma has not been able to maintain uniformity
in its decisions regarding whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.
This has resulted in a loose doctrine which undermines the concept of
corporate existence and separateness. Investors and incorporators will
be very hesitant to incorporate in Oklahoma for fear of potentially unlim-
ited personal liability. This may also result in Oklahoma corporations
relocating where the doctrine is more favorable to small business.162
If Oklahoma would define its equitable considerations more clearly
or make the rule require a single showing such as fraud, practitioners
would have a much better feel for how the courts will rule in each situa-
tion. It would also be helpful if courts would attempt to more clearly
delineate the most significant and relevant instrumentality factors to be
relied upon in veil-piercing analyses. Most importantly, Oklahoma
should attempt to clarify whether it is applying the piercing rule equally
to each type of situation and whether application of the test varies ac-
cording to the underlying cause of action. By clarifying the doctrine,
161. Id. at 504.
162. A newly emerging choice of business format in Oklahoma is the limited liability company
("LLC"). See Oklahoma Limited Liability Co. Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2000 (West Supp.
1993). Some legislatures have addressed veil-piercing in their LLC statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-107 (1992).
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Oklahoma will stand a much better chance of attracting new investment,
fresh capital, and diverse business interests.
Kenneth B. Watt
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